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THE UNSUSTAINABILITY OF 'SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT' 
IN A SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
Nelleke Bak 
Over the last decade 'education for 
sustainable development' has become a 
central concept in environmental education 
(EE). In 1980 the World Conservation Strategt; 
(WCS) was established by the International 
Union of Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources (IUCN), in collaboration 
with the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF) and the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP). Its three objectives of 
conservation were: the maintenance of 
'essential ecological processes', the 
preservation of 'genetic diversity' and the 
'sustainable utilization of resources' 
(Chennells, 1993:4). In 1987, a year after the 
Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster, the 
World Commission on Environment and 
Development issued its landmark report, 
Our Common Future, which tackled 
particularly the third WCS objective and put 
the concept of 'sustainable development' 
before the world's political leaders. Broadly, 
'development' is,. 
the modification of the biosphere and 
the application of human, financial, and 
living and non-living resources to satisfy 
human needs and improve the quality of 
human life (IUCN, 1980:para 1.4). 
'Sustainability' is defined as "development 
that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs" 
(WCED, 1987:47). What the WCED report 
did was to locate 'sustainable development' 
within the economic and political context of 
international development. 
Instead of trying to enter the debate in the 
usual way about what exactly 'sustainable 
development' is, I am going to approach it 
from a different angle and start off by 
looking at what it is not. It should not be 
equated with sustaining the present patterns 
of consumption and waste generated by 
economically dominant societies. Redclift 
(1993) suggests that sustainability is often 
linked to development which asserts the 
notion of 'progress', usually economic 
progress. The implication of such a view is 
that it takes for granted the desirability of 
dominant economic practices and seeks to 
impose these as widely as possible, without 
encouraging a critique thereof. Daly (1993) 
also warns of the dangers of developing 
sustainability along the lines of current 
growth patterns. "It is impossible for the 
world economy to grow its way out of 
poverty and environmental degradation" 
(Daly, 1993:267). In fact, he claims that 
sustainable development means less 
economic growth. 
I will not add to the burgeoning volume of 
literature that tries to address the question, 
'development of what, by whom, for what 
purpose?'. I shall pick up on two key 
concepts that are central in the divergent 
debates on sustainable development. After 
identifying these two key concepts, I try to 
make sense of them by discussing their 
implications in a South African context. 
The first central notion is that traditional 
communities (i.e. marginalised from the 
mainstream economy) have great worth: 
they have often managed to sustain 
themselves for centuries before being 
crushed by 'progress'. Their long-term 
sustainability is evidence, it is claimed, of 
their extensive knowledge of and love for 
their local natural environment. When 
making decisions about local environmental 
issues in particular and about sustainable 
development in general, the knowledge and 
participation of local communities are essential 
(See Adams & McShane, 1992; O'Donoghue, 
1993; Orr, 1992; Prakash, 1995). This is also 
echoed in the Rio Declaration: 
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Indigenous people and their 
communities and other local 
communities, have a vital role in 
environmental management and 
development because of their 
knowledge and traditional practices. 
States should recognise and duly 
support their identity, culture and 
interests and enable their effective 
participation in the achievement of 
sustainable development (UNCED, 1992, 
Principle 22). 
Prakash (1995) argues that although the 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 
claimed to encourage participation by local 
communities, it saw 'sustainable 
development' as something to be managed 
by 'ecocrat' experts, informed by 
complicated legal issues and specialised 
scientific data. The alternative Global NGO 
Forum at the same time drew up The Earth 
Charter which, according to Prakash, 
redefines what we mean by sustainability. 
The Global Forum, made up largely by 
grassroots community groups, claimed to 
represent the millions of people struggling 
on the margins of national economic 
systems, attempting to survive the 
destruction of their environment and to 
regenerate their "own ways of living in their 
non-modem cultural spaces, in their 
formerly flourishing 'commons"'(Prakash, 
1995:5). 
The Global Forum's multitude of 
alternative quests for redefining cultural 
flourishing, social justice and ecological 
sustainability do not proclaim a 
universal recipe or mould. Instead, 
resisting the unsustainable global 
agendas of the dominant societies, they 
urge the humble acceptance of a 
multiplicity of cultural notions of what 
constitutes a good life ... (ibid). 
The second key notion embodied in 
'sustainable development' also emerges in 
Prakash's discussion. Despite the attempt 
by local communities to redefine their own 
cultural notion of what constitutes the good 
life, there is an assumption of a common 
moral goal: the duty to care for the 
environment. Principle 2 of The Earth 
Charter notes that "we recognise our 
diversity and our common partnership", but 
makes no attempt to address the assumed 
link. The notion of a common good is in 
seeming contradiction to the first key 
concept, in that instead of focusing on 
'multiplicity', it focuses on 'commonality'. 
In another paper (Bak, 1992), I looked at the 
tension between own notions of the good life 
and global common goods, but this is not an 
angle I wish to pursue here. What I do want 
to highlight is the moral underpinnings of the 
goal of sustainable development in securing the 
common good. 
I think that writers such as Prakash (1995) 
and Orr (1992) confuse these two notions 
into a romanticised picture of 'pre-modem' 
societies with their knowledge of the 
environment and their commitment to a 
common ecological good. They attribute a 
kind of 'ecological literacy' to them which 
means that these societies (and traditional 
communities) have "theoretical and practical 
understanding, moral imagination and 
aesthetic sensibility" and they "clearly 
appreciate the natural resources they use 
because they live sufficiently close to them" 
(Prakash, 1995:10). This approach assumes 
that these kinds of communities know what 
is (morally) best. It assumes that 'small is 
beautiful' or, put differently, 'local is good'. 
By obfuscating the distinction between these 
two concepts of sustainable development, 
two different kinds of questions are 
confused with each other: i.e. 
a) the question of what is? (or what is 
realistically attainable?), and 
b) the question of what is good? (or 
what is morally desirable?). 
In the rest of the paper I shall focus on the 
link between local community participation 
and the securing of the common good, 
hopefully without obfuscating the 
distinction between questions of what is and 
what is good. I shall argue that we cannot 
assume that local communities, or those 
most directly affected by the problem, will 
necessarily base their decisions on the need 
or wish to care for the environment. 
In a controversial paper, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, published first in 1968, Hardin, 
influenced by Hobbes, looks at the 
management of communally owned 
property. He takes as his example the early 
practice of people grazing their cattle on 
communally owned grazing land, the 
'commons'. The practice was beneficial to 
all those who participated until more and 
more people began to graze more and more 
cattle on the land. The implication of the 
increase in cattle and the limited natural 
resource of grazing was that people for the 
sake of their mutual interests would curtail 
their number of cattle. If not, it was 
reasoned, all grazing would soon be 
destroyed and no one would then benefit. It 
was thus assumed that participants would 
decide to curtail their number of cattle 
voluntarily and so sustain their own 
individual benefit. Hardin shows that, 
instead of securing their own long-tetm 
good, individuals stand to gain more direct 
economic benefits by increasing their number of 
grazing cattle than by sharing the cost of 
overgrazing with all. The rational herder will 
thus conclude that it is more beneficial to 
him directly to increase his use of the natural 
resources. Moreover, if he does not do so, 
the chances are that his neighbour will, and 
this noble sacrifice on! y creates scope for 
others to enrich themselves. And so, instead 
of securing the common good through 
individual sacrifice (or curtailment of 
growth), individual sacrifice encourages 
exploitation by other less scrupulous 
participants. 
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is 
locked into a system that compels him to 
increase his herd without limit, in a 
·world that is limited. Ruin is the 
destination toward which all men rush, 
each pursuing his own interest in a 
society that believes in the freedom of 
the commons (Hardin, 1993:136). 
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The tragedy of the commons example holds 
significant implications for the idea of 
sustainable development. Our modem com-
mons are commonly owned resources like 
the sea and the air. In order to secure the 
sustainability of these resources, economic 
units (countries) need to curtail the use of 
these common resources (or at least ensure 
their long-term re-use) and so ensure their 
sustainability for future generations. But the 
example of the tragedy of the commons 
shows that this is unlikely to happen. It 
throws doubt on a number of commonly 
held assumptions. 
First, it casts doubt on the idea that 
participants will base their decisions on 
considerations of the common good. Just 
because something is morally desirable does 
not mean that people will necessarily act in 
accordance. In order to highlight this, it is 
important to distinguish between the two 
kinds of questions I outlined above. It 
means that individuals (be they individual 
persons, communities or countries) will not 
necessarily regulate their access to the 
commons for the general good. More likely, 
individuals will consider their 'best bet', i.e. 
the one that holds maximum benefits for 
them. 
A possible response to this would be to 
promote education. It could be claimed that 
people do not make the right decisions 
because they are unenlightened or even 
irrational. On this assumption, education for 
sustainability would make people aware of 
how their decisions would affect the 
common good and once they had this 
knowledge, their decisions would be based 
on securing the common good. 
But this is naive, I would argue. The tragedy 
of the commons illustrates that even rational 
considerations would rather secure short-
term benefits for the individual than long-
term benefits for the group. So, the example 
also casts doubt on the faith in rationality of 
securing the common good. It is not only 
nasty, brutish and uninformed L odividuals 
that will make such selfish decisions; as 
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Hardin's example demonstrates, even 
rational individuals will deliberate that it will 
be to their greater advantage to exploit the 
commons. A further illustration of this is 
presented by the 'prisoner's dilemma' in 
which two prisoners are given the option to 
tell on the other (which will result either in 
their going free or being given a life 
sentence) or to remain silent and being 
guaranteed a light sentence. Both pri~oners 
independently opt for the first option, on the 
basis of their not being sure that the other 
will also remain silent. The example 
illustrates that if two (or more) competing 
users of a common resource have the choice 
of either conserving or of depleting they will 
each opt to secure their own maximum 
advantage, for fear that if they do not, their 
competitor will. For a society (or 
international ecological body) to appeal to 
individuals (or countries) to restrain ex-
ploitation of the commons for the sake of the 
common good on the basis of an appeal to 
their conscience or moral considerations, is 
to set up a selective system whereby the 
unscrupulous and immoral will thrive! 
What this means is that the appeal for 
sustainable development cannot be based on 
an appeal to conscience, on an assumption 
that just because one uses the resources, one 
is committed to conserving them on a long-
term basis. Put differently, sustainable 
development cannot rest on the premise that 
community participation will secure the 
common good. 
But what does this mean? Does it mean that 
the notion of 'sustainable development' is a 
counterfeit, a massive scam perpetrated by 
'free riders' who secretly aim to exploit the 
common resources to advantage 
themselves? Perhaps we need not be so 
pessimistic about humans and human life as 
short, nasty and brutish, as Hobbes would 
lead us to believe. Winpenny and Blaikie 
(1992) express the belief that despite the 
tragedy of the commons, not all decisions, 
even rational ones, are motivated by self-
interest. They appeal to the idea that 
'bumble-bees can fly', despite all 
aeronautical principles to the contrary. 
Their assertion is that despite convincing 
arguments to the contrary, people do act 
unselfishly. Individuals do cooperate to 
solve common problems. Appeals to 
conscience can help overcome resistance to 
collective action and individuals do act on 
long-term considerations rather than on 
immediate wants. This resurrection of our 
faith in humanity is comforting, but it 
remains a shaky premise on which to base 
the immense project of sustainable 
development. 
I have questioned the assumed link between 
the two key notions of sustainable 
development and have argued that just 
because communities are affected, this is no 
guarantee that they will work towards 
securing the common good, and even if they 
knew what this common good is, this is no 
guarantee that they are committed to it. I 
shall now focus more specifically on each 
key concept separately. I shall first of all 
look at what the concept of 'community' 
might entail in a South African context, and 
secondly, at whether we can talk about a 
common good in our inherited fragmented 
society. 
If participation by the local community 1s 
essential when deciding about local 
environmental issues, the question naturally 
arises of what would constitute such a local 
community. In debates about sustainable 
development, local community usually 
refers to people located within a specific 
geographical area, an area with particular 
natural resources, a bio-region. Because of 
their physical proximity, it is assumed, 
inhabitants will need to share resources and 
this physical sharing fosters a sense of 
communality and an interest in securing the 
common good (although as I have shown, 
this is a very tenuous link}. In other words, 
inhabitants in a common natural region will 
develop a sense of social belonging, a 
community. But this is simply not true in 
South Africa. In KwaZulu Natal, for 
example, political differences have created 
antagonistic factions within the same 
geographical region. Political supremacy 
has far outweighed considerations about 
sharing natural resources. Also, in most 
towns in South Africa, town planning was 
along lines of racial segregations, divisions 
among inhabitants of the same geographical 
region. We just cannot talk glibly about a 
geographical region (bio-region) as 
constituting a 'local community'. 
Moreover, the concept of 'community' 
entails some notion of homogeneity. I can be 
a member of different communities, for 
example, a member of the Catholic 
community, a member of the ANC, a 
member of the local tennis club, a member of 
the academic community. However, all 
these different communities are bonded by 
a degree of sameness in their members, or 
put differently, by a shared discourse. But 
can we talk about a fairly homogeneous 
community in, for example, South African 
urban townships? People with different 
interests and different languages and 
different practices do of course live together, 
but as I have shown, sheer physical 
proximity does not necessarily constitute a 
sense of community. There are active 
environmental groups operating in 
townships, e.g. the Soweto based NEAC 
(Na tiona! Environmental Awareness 
Campaign), but one cannot equate these to 
the local community. 
Another feature of'community' is a sense of 
rootedness or permanence, a sense of 
'belonging'. Communities are shaped by the 
development of their distinct patterns of 
interaction, but these can only develop over 
a period of time. I find it very difficult to 
conceive of 'instant communities'. With the 
abolition of Influx Control and the Group 
Areas Act, there has been a massive shift in 
demographic concentrations rapid 
urbanisation sees thousands of newcomers 
streaming to urban centres. Coupled with 
this vast migration, are refugees from 
beyond the South African borders. With 
inhabitants of a specific area in a state of 
migratory flux, it is difficult for a sense of 
community to take root. 
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And finally, apartheid has distorted 
development of local communities. On the 
one hand, it has destroyed many rural 
communities through a system of migrant 
labour in which families were separated and 
economically active members (usually men) 
were removed from rural areas to industrial 
or mining centres. On the other hand, 
apartheid tried to force the development of 
'communities' along lines of language and 
ethnicity by designating specific residential 
areas, institutions of learning and political 
homelands to specific linguistic/ ethnic 
groups. In both cases, political coercion 
forced existing communities apart and tlied 
to create new 'communities' by forcing 
people together. 
All this complicates our talk of 'local 
community participation'. Of course, there 
are vibrant and flourishing local 
communities in South Africa, as evidenced 
by the strong bond in many communities 
during the 'struggle years', but the point I 
want to make is that we cannot assume that 
local community participation is a given 
when we have to formulate environmental 
policy of sustainable development. Much of 
the debate around sustainable development 
comes from contexts where certain political, 
economic and social infrastructure is taken 
for granted. However, in a context like 
South Africa where there are high levels of 
economic uncertainty, political instability 
and social insecurity, the appeal to 'local 
community' participation can blind us to the 
particular problems of division, incohesion 
and flux we face in South Africa. 
The last part of the paper deals with the 
second key issue of sustainable 
development, viz the notion of a common 
good. Again, I want to note that the 
common good is not something given; its 
meaning is often obscure or contested. The 
common good is not something outside or 
independent of the community in which it is 
rooted - if it were, it would be an imposed 
set of ideas that would not necessarily be 
shared by the members of that community. 
After all, as the word implies, the good is 
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something intersubjective, something 
shared. Before drawing the conclusion that 
the concept of 'common good' presupposes a 
concept of 'community', I want to elaborate 
on the necessity of intersubjective meanings 
in the development of our understanding of 
what constitutes the common good. 
Taylor's (1985) notion of intersubjective 
meanings points to a way in which we can 
make better sense of what we understand by 
the 'common good' and its rootedness in 
institutions and actual practices (patterns of 
do's and do not's). 
We can think of the difference between 
our society and the simplified version of 
the traditional Japanese village as 
consisting in this, that the range of 
meaning open to the members of the 
two societies is very different. But what 
we are dealing with here is not 
subjective meaning which can fit in to the 
categorial grid of behavioural political 
science, but rather intersubjective 
meanings. It is not just that the people in 
our society all or most! y have a given set 
of ideas in their heads and subscribe to a 
given set of goals. The meanings and 
norms implicit in these practices are not 
just in the minds of the actors but are out 
there in the practices themselves, 
practices which cannot be conceived as a 
set of individual actions, but which are 
essentially modes of social relation, of 
mutual action (Taylor, 1985:36). 
In other words, for the meanings and norms 
of our practices to be intersubjective, they 
need to be rooted in our practices and social 
relations. These meanings constitute a 
certain set of common terms of reference, the 
very terms in which human beings live their 
lives, constitute their self-understandings 
and shape their institutions. These 
intersubjective meanings are what bind 
people's lives together into a common 
framework of meaning and so form the basis 
of community. 
For Taylor (1985) there can be shared 
meanings when beliefs, norms and practices 
converge as, for example, where employees 
of a large corporation all have the shared 
interest to keep the company going, for in 
doing so they are likely to serve their own 
interests by having a job. But one would 
hesitate to call this corporation a 
'community', or at the most a 'weak' 
community. What makes a community a 
community, for Taylor, are stronger 
intersubjective meanings that are part of the 
common reference world where the sharing 
is a collective act that is commonly 
sustained. The 'weaker' or convergent 
meanings do not form as powerful a net as 
common meanings. And for Taylor, 
the result of powerful common 
meanings is the development of a 
greater web of intersubjective meanings 
as people live in community (1985:39). 
Taylor's emphasis on intersubjective 
meanings that constitute and sustain 
communities is an important one. People 
express their meanings in their practices, 
social relations and institutions which 
embody and, in tum, sustain that which they 
deem worthwhile to embody and sustain, in 
other words, their common good. For a 
common good to be sustained and 
supported by the practices, relations and 
institutions by which people live means that 
there must be some intersubjective sense of 
'belonging', a sense of community. 
The point of the above is to show that the 
common good presupposes intersubjective 
meanings (as manifested in the practices, 
social relations and institutions) of a com-
munity. But if this premise is true, and if the 
premise that the sense of community in 
South Africa is largely fragmented, divided 
and in flux, then it weakens the presence of 
a common good in South Africa. Even if we 
were to grant that there are communities in 
South Africa (in the Taylorian sense), we 
must be aware that these communities have 
developed largely in the context of 
apartheid. What this means is that separate 
institutions, social relations and practices 
have developed over the years for 
differently classified population groups. 
Following Taylor's argument, this means 
that different intersubjective meanings have 
developed and so, different conceptions of 
the common good. (In a previous paper, Bak 
1995, I elaborate on this point, showing that 
not every group in South Africa accept that 
the implementation of environmental 
education is a good thing; there are 
competing concepts of the common good 
based on notions of economic justice). So 
even if we were to accept that there are 
(Taylorian) communities, given the 
inheritance of divisions, these different 
communities will have different common 
goods. So talk of the common good in South 
Africa is loose talk. 
Finally, the two premises that cast doubt on 
the existence of communities and of the 
common good in South Africa, also cast 
doubt on the chances of success of an 
environmental policy based on sustainable 
development. What this means is that we 
need to focus on the question of what is 
possible, i.e. the question of whether 
sustainable development can be pursued, 
rather than try and obfuscate the problems 
under a guise of what is morally desirable, 
i.e. to focus on the question whether 
sustainable development ought to be 
pursued. Unless we address the problems 
found in a South African context in trying to 
answer the first question, sustainable 
development is unsustainable. 
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